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A.C. Engelbrecht, G.K. Goldswain & A. Heyns
3A B S T R A C T
5Pyott Ltd v CIR is generally regarded as the seminal case in South Africa 
on the tax treatment of deposits received on containers that may 
be returned at a later stage for a refund. This article analyses the tax 
treatment of deposits, prepayments and advances from a gross income 
point of view, as well as the possibility of claiming a deduction for the 
contingent liability to refund such deposit.
6The main objective of this article is to discuss the judgment in the 
Pyott case and establish whether the principle enunciated that deposits, 
received in respect of returnable containers, are taxable in full once 
received, can also be extended to receipts of deposits, prepayments and 
advances where no returnable container is involved.
7The conclusions reached are that the principles laid down in the Pyott 
case are still relevant today, apart from possible relief which may now 
be claimed under the subsequently introduced section 24C. Where 
no container is involved, benefi cial ownership must fi rst be established 
before such deposit, prepayment or advance becomes taxable, taking 
into account the specifi c provisions of legislation such as the Rental 
Housing Act and the Consumer Protection Act. The research has also 
shown coherence in the treatment of deposits for income tax purposes 
and other taxes, such as value-added tax.
8Key words:  deposits, prepayments and advances, benefi cial ownership, contingent liability, 
Consumer Protection Act, Rental Housing Act
1From as far back as 1886 in South Africa, if you heard the name “Pyott”, you 
immediately thought of biscuits. Many children were given a treat of an Iced Zoo 
biscuit for being well behaved or doing well at school while adults indulged in 
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Romany Cream biscuits at tea time. A Salticrax biscuit with a savoury topping is still 
a favourite snack, especially at cheese and wine parties or predinner drinks. These 
three name-brand biscuits were manufactured by Pyott Limited until the company 
was taken over by Bakers Limited in 1983, and even today, more than a hundred 
years after the first Pyott’s biscuit came out of the oven, they are as popular as ever.
2The setting of the Pyott case is the Second World War, a most difficult historical 
period for South Africa and, indeed, for the world. During this time, Pyott Limited 
unwittingly became involved in what is now regarded as one of the seminal tax 
cases in South African tax law on the taxability of deposits on containers. The main 
question raised related to whether a deposit, received by a taxpayer for a container 
that could be returned later by the customer and the deposit refunded, should be 
included in “gross income” as defined in section 7 of the Income Tax Act No. 31 of 
1941, a definition that is essentially now embodied in section 1 of the present Income 
Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 (“Income Tax Act”).
3The case, which went all the way to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court 
of South Africa, now known as the Supreme Court of Appeal, was decided in 1945 
and was reported as Pyott Ltd v CIR.1 The decision was handed down by Davis AJA, 
with Watermeyer CJ and Tindall, Feetham and Greenberg JJA concurring, and has 
set a precedent for the tax treatment of deposits on containers.
4Although the Pyott case is regarded as the seminal case on the taxability of so-
called “deposits” generally, it only dealt with deposits on containers. The question, 
however, is can the principle of taxing deposits on containers be extended to other 
types of deposits received that do not involve the return of an asset? For example, 
was the principle, as enunciated by Davis AJA, sufficiently wide to include within its 
ambit an advance of funds or a deposit in terms of a construction agreement, hire-
purchase agreement or in respect of the rental of property?
5Very little has been written recently on the taxability of deposits, in spite of the fact 
that there is now a Consumer Protection Act,2 (“Consumer Protection Act”), a Rental 
Housing Act3 (“Rental Housing Act”) and later judicial decisions that could impact 
upon the general principles as set out in the Pyott case. Thus, the most important 
contribution that this article makes to the body of tax law is to explore, analyse and 
discuss the scope and ambit of what presently constitutes a taxable deposit for income 
tax purposes.
1 Pyott Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1945 AD 128, 13 SATC 121.
2 No. 68 of 2008.
3 No. 50 of 1999.
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6This article is a tax story. Hence, of necessity, there is a story behind the tax 
case that brings it to life and sets it in its historical context. This article will thus 
commence by briefly delving into the interesting life of the man behind the company 
that bore his name, the history of the company and its eventual demise when taken 
over by Bakers Limited, explain why biscuit tins were used as containers in which the 
biscuits were sold, why the deposits charged on tin containers increased dramatically 
and how this dramatic increase was the novus actus interveniens (new intervening act) 
that precipitated the dispute between the then Commissioner for Inland Revenue 
(“Commissioner”) and Pyott Limited in respect of the taxability of deposits on 
containers.
7This will be followed by an analysis of the facts and the decision in the Pyott 
case and the identification of the ratio decidendi (the rationale for the decision). The 
notion of a “beneficial receipt” will also be discussed as it pertains to and influences 
the taxability of deposits generally. Any obiter dicta (remarks not necessary for 
reaching a decision) of Davis AJA will further be identified and discussed. Thereafter, 
subsequently decided deposit, prepayment and advance receipt cases will be analysed 
and discussed in the light of the Pyott decision, particularly those decisions that have 
made a contribution to and assist with defining the scope, ambit and meaning of a 
taxable deposit, prepayment or advance. Furthermore, the tax treatment of deposits 
for income tax purposes will be examined in the light of their treatment in terms 
of the Value-Added Tax Act4 (“VAT Act”) and related commercial legislation to 
establish whether these legislative provisions have restricted the taxability of deposits 
as determined by Davis AJA in the Pyott case.
8Finally, this article will briefly analyse and discuss the possibility of claiming 
permissible deductions or allowances in terms of the Income Tax Act with regard to 
the contingent obligation to refund a deposit on the return of the container. Since 
the Court in the Pyott case restricted itself to consideration of the meaning of the 
words “actually incurred”, which is but one of the prerequisites for the deductibility 
of expenditure in terms of section 11(a) of the Income Tax Act, it is considered 
beyond the scope of this article to discuss and analyse any of the other prerequisites 
for the application of that section. The conclusions reached, based on the research, 
should confirm whether or not the ratio decidendi in the Pyott case still has relevance 
today for the tax treatment of deposits generally, or whether the decision should be 
restricted to deposits on containers only.
4 No. 89 of 1991.
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The story behind the case: The characters, institutions and the 
historical context
1The baking and consumption of biscuits can be traced back as far as the Roman 
Empire when they were supplied to troops deployed in the field. By cooking the 
dough twice, the bakers produced a hard and dry food item that could be kept for 
long periods of time without deteriorating.5 Later, when the early British explorers 
went to sea for long periods, they also needed food that would not deteriorate easily. 
They took with them the so-called “Ship Biscuits” for sustenance and nourishment.6 
When British biscuit manufacturers later explored the overseas markets, they found 
that biscuits packed into tins would stay fresh for longer. The tins were soldered 
along the seams and lid in order to keep air and moisture out to prevent the growth 
of mould.
2At the young age of 10, John Pyott, born in Dundee, Scotland, in May 1862, was 
apprenticed as a baker. Owing to health problems, he immigrated to South Africa. 
In the early 1880s, in Port Elizabeth, he started out by producing sweets and cakes.7 
Shortly after, South Africa was struck by “gold fever” and Pyott joined the “gold 
rush” to the Gold Fields – sometime between 1882 and 1885. Bearing in mind the 
rugged terrain, the distance to be covered and the fact that there was no motorised 
transport, he had limited alternatives at his disposal and set off by travelling from Port 
Elizabeth to Durban by sea. There he bought a horse for his travels to the Transvaal 
Gold Fields,8 intending to cover the remainder of his journey on horseback.
3Shortly after his departure from Durban, Pyott met a much older man travelling 
alone in a Cape Cart – but the horse was lame. Seizing the “opportunity” that had 
arisen, he offered the use of his fit horse in return for a more comfortable ride in the 
cart. His companion turned out to be none other than Paul Kruger,9 who in 1883, 
became the fifth state president of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (“ZAR”).10
4It is not clear whether their meeting took place before or after Kruger became 
president; what Kruger was doing in Durban by himself (probably related to the 
ZAR’s attempts to gain access to a harbour); whether it opened doors for Pyott in his 
later business endeavours and personal and political achievements (which included 
membership of the Port Elizabeth Town Council, the Legislative Council of the 
 5 Baumann LG A Short History of the Biscuit Industry in South Africa. [Online] (LG Baumann Durban (2006)) Available at: 





10 South African History. Stephanus Johannes Kruger. [Online] Available at: http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/
stephanus-johannes-kruger (Accessed: 30 July 2013).
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Upper House of Review of the Cape Parliament, the Eastern Circle to Union-making 
and the Board of Directors of the Reserve Bank),11 or what the topics of discussion 
were during their trip. One can only surmise.
5John Pyott’s gold dreams, however, were rather short-lived. The rough way of 
life convinced him that this was no place for a family to have a decent life – at this 
stage he had a wife and a baby. He and his family thus returned to Port Elizabeth, 
establishing the Port Elizabeth Steam Confectionery Works (1886) and later 
converting the business to a limited liability company, Pyott Limited.12 The company 
expanded and sold its biscuit products throughout South Africa, using a little pixie 
as its trademark on its packaging. It became the best-known biscuit brand in South 
Africa.13
6Until the mid-1940s, the biscuits had largely been packaged in beautiful painted 
tins on which a deposit was charged, to be refunded on the return of the tin. However, 
storekeepers and households alike also found the tins useful for the storage of other 
dry food products like rice, flour and maize meal, resulting in only 25 to 30 percent of 
the biscuit tins being returned by the customers for a refund of the deposit originally 
paid.
7With the advent of the Second World War, metals, particularly tin, were required 
for military purposes. The manufacture of ships, planes, guns and ammunition took 
precedence over civilian products. In the United Kingdom, the War Production 
Board ordered a reduction in the use of metals used for packaging and this resulted 
in the rationing of even canned foods.14 South Africa, being part of the British 
Commonwealth at that time, could not escape the rationing of metals.
8The rationing decree also affected the distribution and selling of biscuits in tins 
by Pyott Limited. If there were no biscuit tins, the company’s products could not be 
packaged in a form that would keep the biscuits fresh. Something drastic, therefore, 
had to be done and it took the form of a 200 percent increase in the deposit charged 
on a biscuit tin to encourage customers to return these containers. Clearly, the 
11 Baumann LG A Short History of the Biscuit Industry in South Africa. [Online] (LG Baumann Durban (2006)) Available at: 
http://teriton.co.za/ (Accessed: 30 July 2013); Beyers CJ, Basson JL et al Dictionary of South African Biography Volume 
V (Human Sciences Research Council Pretoria (1987)) 617.
12 Baumann LG A Short History of the Biscuit Industry in South Africa. [Online] (LG Baumann Durban (2006)) Available at: 
http://teriton.co.za/ (Accessed: 30 July 2013).
13 Supra.
14 Sundin, Sarah. 2011. Make It Do – Metal Shortages During World War II. [Online] Available at: http://www.sarahsun-
din.com/make-it-do-metal-shortages-during-world-war-ii/ (Accessed: 29 July 2013); Oklahoma Historical Society’s 
Encyclopedia of Oklahoma History and Culture. War Production Board. [Online] Available at: http://digital.library.
okstate.edu/encyclopedia/entries/R/RA016.html (Accessed: 29 July 2013); Ames Historical Society. World War II Ra-
tioning Page 3. [Online] Available at: http://www.ameshistoricalsociety.org/exhibits/events/rationing.htm (Accessed: 
29 July 2013).
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company’s primary goal was securing the continuation of its primary business, the 
selling of its biscuits, and its goal was not to earn greater profits from the disposal 
of tin containers. How the company wanted to treat these refundable deposits and 
the way the Commissioner treated these items for tax purposes, meant that the only 
solution was to proceed all the way to the Appellate Division to have these issues 
finally settled.
The Pyott case: Facts, decision, ratio decidendi and obiter dicta
1The 200 percent increase in the deposit on the tin containers had the desired effect 
with a dramatic increase in the number of tins being returned for a refund by its 
customers – from about 30 percent prior to the war, when the deposit was relatively 
low, to some 90 percent after the increase had been imposed.15 As a result, the 
company no longer considered these charges to be part of its distributable profits, as 
had previously been the case.16 Thus, in its financial statements for the year ended 
30 June 1941, an amount of £9 000 was shown in the balance sheet as a “provision 
for allowances on tin containers returnable”.
2The Commissioner treated these deposits received on the containers as part of the 
gross income of the company, but disallowed any deduction regarding the contingent 
liability that arose to refund these deposits on the return of the containers. This 
was in spite of the fact that a 90 percent rate of return was expected. The company 
appealed the decision of the Commissioner to the Special Court for Hearing Income 
Tax Appeals, but this court upheld the assessment.17
3This led to the company appealing to the Eastern Districts Local Division of the 
Supreme Court, which was called upon to decide the following three issues:
• Whether the amount of income (if income at all) was the amount charged (the 
deposit), less the amount of obligations undertaken (the potential refunds to be 
made)
• Whether the company was entitled to account for the liability, or whether this 
was forbidden by section 12(e) (the equivalent provision now embodied in section 
23(e) of the present Income Tax Act), which prohibits accounting reserves from 
being deducted
• Whether the transaction was neither capital nor income.18
15 Pyott supra 123.
16 Pyott supra 123.
17 Pyott supra 122, 123.
18 Pyott supra 122.
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1The Eastern Districts Local Division of the Supreme Court confirmed the Special 
Court’s decision and on further appeal, Davis AJA, in a unanimous decision of the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, held that:
1. The appellant’s attempt to rely on the Lategan19 decision by arguing that the 
“total amount” referred to in the definition of gross income must first be valued 
before it can be included, was rejected. A sale for cash is a sale for ready money 
– it can only be included at its face value,20 it is only other forms of property 
(non-cash) that must be valued.21 There can be no “obligation which ‘attaches’ 
to cash”22 that can require a reduced inclusion.
2. The Income Tax Act lays down what is to be taxed, even if, in doing so, the 
principles of sound accountancy and English case law supporting the making 
of such a provision, are disregarded (following the earlier decision in the George 
Forest Timber23 case).24 The Income Tax Act and its counterpart in England 
differ in the sense that “profits or gains”25 (accounting concepts) are taxable in 
England, whilst South Africa has an artificial and purely statutory definition of 
taxable income, which is not necessarily synonymous with “profits or gains”. It 
is interesting to note that the Income Tax (Consolidation) Act No. 41 of 1917 
had earlier specifically scrapped the definition of income as meaning “profits or 
gains”. What has to be ascertained is “taxable income”, and this must be done 
in the manner prescribed by the Income Tax Act and in no other manner. In 
addition, cases that have been decided in foreign countries, where the definition 
is not identical to local legislation, cannot be of assistance in interpreting such 
definition26 (which follows the decision in the Delfos27 case). The provision 
for refunds on containers was held to be a reserve out of income to provide 
for a contingent liability, and its deduction was specifically prohibited by the 
equivalent provision now contained in section 23(e)28 of the Income Tax Act.
3. The deposit cannot be “non-capital” and yet “not income” – this is a halfway 
house of which Davis AJA had no knowledge29 – it must either be “capital” or 
19 Lategan WH v CIR 1926 CPD 203, 2 SATC 16.
20 Pyott supra 125.
21 Pyott supra 126.
22 Pyott supra 126.
23 CIR v George Forest Timber Co Ltd 1924 AD 516, 1 SATC 20.
24 Pyott supra 126.
25 Pyott supra 126.
26 Pyott supra 127.
27 CIR v Delfos 1933 AD 242, 6 SATC 92.
28 Previously section 12(e) – Pyott supra 127.
29 Pyott supra 126.
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“income”.30 Seeing that the taxpayer had already conceded that the proceeds 
were not capital in nature, the judge, by implication, held that the proceeds 
were revenue in nature.
1The appeal was thus dismissed.
2Davis AJA made an interesting comment in relation to the company’s contention 
that the deposits on containers were “trust moneys” and could therefore not form part 
of its income. His obiter observation on this point was that, if these deposits had been 
put into a separate trust account, out of the taxpayer’s control, these amounts might 
not have been taxable. This is due to the fact that a trustee acts in a fiduciary capacity, 
whereby an asset or money is received and held in trust on behalf of or for the benefit 
of another. It is for this reason that deposits made by purchasers for property to be 
purchased and placed in a trust account, are not considered to be taxable at that stage. 
Only on subsequently applying it as part of the consideration for the transaction (and 
no longer being held as trust funds) can it become taxable for the seller by way of an 
inclusion in “gross income” or “proceeds” for capital gains tax purposes.
3In effect, the decision therefore unequivocally and clearly states the position with 
regard to the taxability of the proceeds from deposits on returnable containers. It also 
establishes the position regarding the non-deductibility of the contingent liability 
arising to refund the deposits on the return of these containers, as section 23(e) 
prohibits the deduction of income that is carried to any reserve fund or which is 
capitalised in any way.
4In taking the analysis and discussion further to decide whether the principle 
laid down in the Pyott case dealing with the taxability of deposits on returnable 
containers, could be expanded to include, for example, deposits, prepayments and 
other advances that do not involve an asset to be returned for a refund, it is necessary 
to first examine the concept “beneficiality”.
The concept “benefi ciality” in South African tax law
1Before an amount can form part of “gross income”, it must constitute a beneficial 
rather than merely a physical receipt. Whether a taxpayer has a beneficial interest 
in the receipt will ultimately depend upon the intention of the respective parties to 
a transaction (such as the terms and conditions applying and the capacity in which 
an amount is received), the circumstances of the case and the impact of commercial 
legislation.
30 Pyott supra 126.
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2In Geldenhuys v CIR,31 a widow carried on farming operations in the Karoo. 
When her husband died, she accepted a usufructary interest created under their 
mutual will, which provided that their children would be appointed sole heirs of 
the estate, while she would merely have the use of the assets during her lifetime. 
Included in the joint estate and thus subject to the usufructary interest, was a flock 
of sheep, which the widow later had to sell because of a drought in the area. The 
proceeds were deposited in her personal bank account, but the court held that this 
did not constitute “gross income” in her hands since the number of sheep remaining 
at the date of sale was smaller than when her usufruct had commenced. Hence there 
was no fruit (progeny) for her to share in. At the end of the usufructary period, in her 
case on her death, her estate had to return to the heirs either the number of sheep still 
held by her under the usufruct or the cash equivalent. Accordingly, on the sale of the 
sheep, she did not receive the proceeds on her own behalf and for her own benefit32 – 
the meaning now widely attributed to the term “received by” for the purposes of the 
“gross income” definition.
3In Holley v CIR,33 the court gave a similar decision in respect of a fideicommissum 
created in favour of a widow.34 The amounts received by the taxpayer in his capacity 
as fiduciary35 were thus not beneficially received by him and could not form part of 
his gross income.
4See also Hiddingh v CIR36 and Rishworth v SIR37 from which a distinction can be 
made between the disposal of income after its beneficial receipt or accrual in favour 
of a taxpayer and the disposal of a right to future income before its beneficial receipt 
or accrual.
5The taxpayer in CIR v Witwatersrand Association of Racing Clubs38 organised a race 
meeting and declared that the proceeds from the meeting were to be divided amongst 
two non-profit (tax exempt) charities. Much to its surprise, the Association was held 
liable for normal tax on such proceeds, notwithstanding the moral obligation which 
rested upon it to distribute the proceeds in accordance with its declared intention. 
The court held that the Association had acted as the principal in organising the 
race meeting, rather than as the agent merely receiving the moneys on behalf of 
31 Geldenhuys v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1947 (3) SA 256 (C), 14 SATC 419.
32 Geldenhuys supra 430 (of 14 SATC 419) – note that the judgment in Geldenhuys’ case referred to “on his own behalf 
for his own benefi t” and not “on her own behalf and for her own benefi t”.
33 Holley v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1947 (3) SA 119 (A), 14 SATC 407.
34 Holley supra 408 (of 14 SATC 407).
35 Holley supra 417.
36 Hiddingh v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1941 AD 111, 11 SATC 205.
37 Rishworth v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1964 (4) SA 493 (A), 26 SATC 275.
38 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Witwatersrand Association of Racing Clubs 1960 (3) SA 291 (A), 23 SATC 380.
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the charities. Thus the proceeds distributed to the charities resulted in a disposal of 
income subsequent to its beneficial receipt or accrual and were included in the gross 
income of the Association, but with no deduction being permissible as the proceeds 
distributed were akin to a donation.
6These cases establish an important tax principle: once a revenue amount is 
beneficially received by or accrued to or in favour of a taxpayer, it must be included 
as gross income, irrespective of its subsequent payment to some other person. The 
only way for it not to be included in the taxable income of a taxpayer is where it 
either qualifies for an exemption or an allowable deduction or an allowance can be 
claimed against it. Accordingly, where a deposit on a container is received beneficially 
(as in the Pyott case), it will constitute gross income, irrespective of the contingent 
obligation to repay it once the container is returned.
7Whether the principles enunciated in the Pyott case were expanded by the judiciary 
to include deposits or advances, even where no underlying asset has to be returned for 
a refund, is discussed below.
Subsequent cases dealing with deposits and related receipts
1In both Brookes Lemos Ltd v CIR39 and in Greases (SA) Ltd v CIR,40 the courts 
followed the decision in the Pyott case. The courts held that the respective taxpayers 
were not trustees for the deposits received on containers because in both cases they 
used the deposits on the containers in their general day-to-day operations. In neither 
of these cases nor in the Pyott case was there an absolute obligation to return the 
containers to the taxpayers.
2In ITC 707,41 no container was involved – instead, an undertaker carried on a 
funeral insurance business and, in addition, conducted a prepaid funeral scheme for 
persons not accepted in the insurance scheme. This resulted in the taxpayer receiving 
payments in advance for funeral services only to be rendered in the future. These 
prepayments were held to be “gross income” because they were not put into a separate 
trust fund and the taxpayer had dealt with these moneys as if they were his own 
property, thus constituting a beneficial receipt. While this finding might once again 
have violated accounting principles, the prepayments were still held to be taxable. 
The decision in this case is discussed again later in this article when dealing with 
39 Brookes Lemos Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1947 (3) All SA 137 (A), 14 SATC 295.
40 Greases (SA) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1951 (3) SA 518 (A), 17 SATC 358.
41 ITC 707 1950, 17 SATC 224.
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the Consumer Protection Act and the possibility that, if decided today, the decision 
would have differed.
3During a period of sabbatical leave taken to do research, a university lecturer 
in ITC 134642 resigned his position. On resignation, he was obliged, in terms of his 
employment contract, to refund the six-month salary he had received while on leave. 
The lecturer argued that the salary for this period was neither “received by” nor 
“accrued to” him owing to the contingent obligation to repay it in the event of his 
resigning. The court, however, held that the contingent liability to repay the salary did 
not have the effect of excluding the salary received from gross income. Subsequently, 
section 11(nA) was introduced into the Income Tax Act and now at least provides for 
relief in the form of a deduction once the amount has been refunded by the employee.
4These latter two cases support the taxability of deposits, prepayments and other 
advances beneficially received, even if not in respect of a returnable container. However, 
it is submitted that these decisions do not imply that all deposits, prepayments or 
advances, once received, will necessarily constitute “gross income”. In C v COT43 the 
company sold fuel and operated a service station in Zimbabwe. Included among its 
customers were those who purchased fuel for their fleets of vehicles for which they 
paid on a monthly basis. After rejecting the idea of obtaining a bank loan to fund 
the supply of the fuel, the company offered these fleet owner customers the option of 
either paying cash for purchases, or continuing to pay their fuel bills monthly, after 
making a deposit amounting to one-twelfth of their annual purchases.
5All deposits were paid into the company’s only bank account, and these funds were 
utilised to purchase fuel and meet other expenses of the business – a situation similar 
to the deposit cases discussed. These deposits were included as part of its creditors 
on the balance sheet and remained there until the individual customer had closed 
his account and the deposit had been refunded. The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe 
held that such deposits did not constitute gross income, but rather working capital 
to be equated with a loan for which there was a definite (non-contingent) liability to 
repay. The absence of any liability to pay interest on these “loans” was explained by 
the benefit the customers enjoyed in not paying interest on the value of purchases for 
a period of 30 days.
6This decision, although only of persuasive value since it originated in Zimbabwe, 
aligns with the Special Board Decision No. 16644 where individual lessors received 
rental deposits, reflected as current liabilities and refundable upon the expiry of the 
42 ITC 1346 1981, 44 SATC 31.
43 C v COT 1984 (3) SA 210 (ZS), 46 SATC 57.
44 Special Board Decision No. 166 (Germiston Special Board, 18 March 2002) 37.
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respective leases. They were entitled to deduct from the deposits to be refunded any 
amounts owing to them by the respective lessees at the end of the lease period. The 
Commissioner contended that these deposits constituted “gross income” as they 
were paid into the taxpayers’ respective business banking accounts. In his ruling, the 
Chairman of the board, Mr HV Vorster, held that there was no contingency attached 
to the taxpayers’ obligation to refund these deposits. This feature alone distinguished 
this case from the container deposit cases already discussed. These rental deposits 
could not be distinguished from borrowed money. While the Commissioner 
contended that the taxpayers’ right to set off established claims against the tenants’ 
deposits meant that the obligation to repay was not absolute, this overlooked the fact 
that, where set-off applied, the obligation to repay was discharged only to the extent 
of such set-off. The right of set-off did not render the taxpayers’ obligations to repay 
these deposits as conditional.
7In a similar vein, the court in CIR v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd,45 had earlier held that 
amounts or articles borrowed for the use of a business do not constitute “receipts” to 
the borrower.46 It is not every obtaining of physical control over money or money’s 
worth that constitutes a receipt for the purposes of “gross income”. At the same time, 
if the borrower is given possession, he or she falls under an unconditional obligation 
to repay it. What is borrowed does not beneficially become his or hers.47 However, in 
the MP Finance Group CC48 case, the court held that investments received under an 
illegal pyramid scheme, a scheme that was insolvent ab initio (from the start), were 
nonetheless taxable as the perpetrators of the scheme had treated these deposits as in 
the nature of income and as its own funds.
8While this decision has been and should be subject to severe criticism – it does 
not take into account the fact that the investors have lost part of their investments 
owing to the fact that SARS is taxing the recipient on “receipt” of these investments – 
the court’s sentiments indicate support for the inclusion of unconditional refundable 
deposits, which are illegally treated as income and part of the taxpayer’s own funds, 
in the taxpayer’s “gross income”. Although the constitutional principles involved, 
such as the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one’s property (section 25 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996) were not argued or even 
discussed in the case and may have resulted in a different decision, such a discussion 
is considered to be beyond the scope of this article.
45 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd 1955 (3) SA 293 (A), 20 SATC 113.
46 Genn supra 114 (of 20 SATC 113).
47 Genn supra 123.
48 MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v Commissioner for South African Revenue Service 2007 (5) SA 521 (SCA), 69 
SATC 141.
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9It is submitted that the principles enunciated in the Pyott case have been religiously 
followed in subsequent cases, especially where the deposits relate to containers that 
may be returned for a refund. If there is a mere contingent obligation to refund such 
deposit, this will imply that a beneficial receipt has in fact taken place. However, 
where the deposit is more akin to a loan with a definite and unconditional liability to 
refund it (unless illegally treated as the income of the taxpayer) as found in the fuel 
deposit (C v COT49) or the rental deposit (Special Board Decision No 16650) cases, these 
deposits are not included in “gross income” because of the absence of a beneficial 
receipt.
10As the general definition of “gross income” specifically excludes receipts or accruals 
of a capital nature, it is clear that the decisions in the cases already discussed, cannot 
extend to deposits, prepayments or other advances relating to assets which are capital 
in nature in the hands of the seller. However, in the absence of specific legislation, as 
is the case where the Consumer Protection Act or other legislation applies, a portion 
of such capital receipt may be included in the taxpayer’s taxable income in terms of 
section 26A read together with the Eighth Schedule (taxation of capital gains) of the 
Income Tax Act. Any further discussion on the aspect of capital receipts, however, is 
considered to be beyond the scope of this article.
11Having explored the relevant case law in relation to the general scope and 
ambit of the taxability of deposits, prepayments and other advances for income tax 
purposes, it is now considered necessary to analyse, discuss and compare the income 
tax treatment of deposits to the treatment for value-added tax purposes as well as the 
possible impact of specific commercial legislation. Section 35A of the Income Tax Act 
will also be examined in this light.
Value-added tax and section 35A of the Income Tax Act
1Section 7 of the VAT Act provides that VAT is levied, inter alia, on the supply of 
goods and services in the course or furtherance of an enterprise. Theoretically, there 
should thus be a correlation between the treatment of deposits received by business 
enterprises for income tax and VAT purposes, but is this really the case?
2The VAT Act (section 1) defines the term “consideration” as, inter alia, including 
any payment made or to be made, including any deposit on a returnable container, 
whether in money or otherwise, in relation to the supply of goods or services. The 
49 Supra.
50 Supra.
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definition further specifies that any deposit, other than a deposit on a returnable 
container, whether refundable or not, shall not be considered as payment for such 
supply unless and until the supplier applies the deposit as consideration for the 
supply, or such deposit is forfeited. Thus, while a deposit on a returnable container 
is specifically included as part of the consideration that is subject to VAT, any other 
type of deposit will be excluded from the consideration and not be subject to VAT 
until such time that it is applied as part of the consideration for the transaction, or 
such deposit is forfeited.
3Where a deposit serves the purpose of providing security only and is definitely 
refundable, it should be akin to a loan and neither gives rise to any beneficial receipt 
nor forms part of the consideration for a supply for VAT purposes. Unless and until it 
is either applied as part of the consideration for a transaction, or forfeited, it cannot be 
subject to VAT or be included in “gross income” for income tax purposes. All deposits 
form part of the consideration and are subject to VAT, other than those classified as 
providing security only (which are definitely refundable), prepayments and advances.
4In support of the contention that refundable security deposits are not taxable, 
reference can also be made to section 35A of the Income Tax Act. This section provides 
for a withholding tax on the proceeds payable to a non-resident seller in respect of 
the disposal of immovable property situated in the Republic. The withholding tax 
does not apply in respect of any deposit paid by the purchaser for the purposes of 
securing the disposal of such immovable property, until the agreement for that 
disposal has been entered into. It appears that such deposits can only become subject 
to the withholding tax once applied as part of the payment for the sale by setting 
it off against the outstanding balance. The treatment of a security deposit for the 
purposes of section 35A thus also closely resembles its respective income tax and VAT 
treatment.
Commercial legislation that impacts upon a benefi cial receipt
1Commercial legislation can impact directly upon the question of whether a 
beneficial receipt has in fact taken place. To illustrate this, the Rental Housing Act 
provides that a landlord is obliged to invest any deposit received from a tenant in 
an interest-bearing account with a financial institution and, at the end of the lease 
agreement, to pay the tenant interest thereon at the rate applicable to such account 
(section 5(3)(d)). While the landlord may apply or set off such deposit and interest 
earned towards the settlement of all amounts for which the tenant is liable under 
the lease agreement, including the reasonable cost of repairing any damage caused 
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by the tenant and replacing lost keys, the remaining balance, if any, must be paid 
over to the tenant (section 5(3)(g)).
2This, no doubt, implies that such deposits are held purely for security purposes 
and do not become the property of the landlord when the deposit is made. Rather, the 
deposits remain the property of the respective tenants and are to be refunded with 
interest thereon. Only once and to the extent subsequently set off against amounts 
due by the tenant, can the deposit become beneficially received by and, thus, “gross 
income” of the landlord. This supports the ruling in Special Board Decision No. 
16651and the decision in C v COT52 and the same principle should thus apply in the 
case of other security deposits received. There are no comparative VAT implications, 
as the supply of residential accommodation in a dwelling is an exempt supply (section 
12(d)).
3The Consumer Protection Act, in turn, deals with a variety of commercial 
transactions. Lay-by transactions where a supplier agrees to sell specified goods and 
accepts payment in periodic instalments while holding such goods until the consumer 
has paid the full price (section 62(1)), is but one example. This section further provides 
for these instalments to remain the property of the consumer until the goods have 
been delivered to the consumer. Until that stage, the instalment is effectively treated 
as a security deposit. If the supplier should, for a reason beyond his or her control, not 
be able to deliver such goods to the consumer, these instalments must be refunded to 
the consumer with interest (section 62(2) of the Consumer Protection Act). Section 
62(4) of the same Act, however, provides for situations in which a termination penalty 
can be levied and deducted from the amount to be refunded – a situation similar to 
that envisaged by the Rental Housing Act.
4These provisions can possibly impact on the income tax treatment of lay-by 
agreements because, normally, there cannot be any beneficial receipt or accrual in 
respect of a sale until delivery has taken place and the quality and quantity of the 
goods have been accepted by the purchaser and ownership has passed into his or her 
name. Furthermore, such treatment would follow the provisions of the VAT Act as 
lay-by agreements are not deemed to represent a supply of goods or services for VAT 
purposes unless and until the goods have been delivered to the purchaser (section 
8(4)(a)). Any amount retained on termination of the agreement will be deemed to be 
a charge for services rendered by the supplier (section 8(4)(b)) and take place when 
51 Supra.
52 Supra.
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the agreement is terminated (section 9(2)(c)). Only on delivery of the goods or on 
termination of the agreement does a supply and beneficial receipt take place.
5Surprisingly, SARS holds a different view by stating in Interpretation Note No. 
4853 that section 24 of the Income Tax Act also applies to lay-by agreements of not 
less than twelve months (no mention is made of the treatment of lay-by agreements 
covering less than twelve months). In short, section 24 applies to “credit agreements” 
where ownership will only pass in favour of the purchaser upon or after the whole 
or a certain portion of the full consideration has been received by the seller. Section 
24(1) then provides that the full consideration (excluding finance charges) will be 
deemed to have accrued on the date of concluding such agreement, notwithstanding 
that ownership has not passed in favour of the purchaser.
6It is submitted that SARS’ view on this aspect ignores an important distinction 
between section 24 “credit agreements” and lay-by agreements. This inevitably raises 
doubt about the merits of the suggested SARS treatment of lay-by agreements, which 
clearly should fall outside the scope of section 24. First and foremost, property under 
section 24 “credit agreements” is delivered or made available to the purchaser on 
or soon after the conclusion of the agreement. This is in direct contrast to lay-by 
agreements where the goods are only delivered after full payment has been made. 
The only similarity may be that ownership will only pass once full payment has been 
made.
7Interpretation Note No. 48 further attempts to draw a parallel between section 24 
“credit agreements” for income tax purposes and “instalment credit agreements” as 
defined in section 1 of the VAT Act by stating that section 24 applies in the case of 
an “instalment credit agreement”. While there may be some overlap between these 
agreements, they are clearly not identical in that “instalment credit agreements” also 
comprise transactions where ownership has already passed on delivery of the goods, 
as well as certain lease agreements. It is submitted that such agreements do not fall 
under section 24 “credit agreements”.
8Returning to the suggested treatment of lay-by transactions and its similarity 
to both “credit agreements” and “instalment credit agreements”, the definition 
of an “instalment credit agreement” clearly makes reference to “delivery to or the 
use, possession or enjoyment” (paragraph (a)(iv)(aa)) and “return of those goods” 
(paragraph (a)(iv)(bb)). No doubt, delivery is once more envisaged and ultimately 
53 A copy of Interpretation Note No. 48 is contained, inter alia, in 2013/14 SAICA Legislation Handbook Volume 2 (Lex-
isNexis (2014)) at 438.
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required in order to meet this definition. The levying of finance charges by the 
supplier on these transactions as well as in the case of “credit agreements” further 
presupposes delivery. Otherwise, why would the purchaser be prepared to pay the 
finance charges if possession of the article is lacking? By contrast, lay-by agreements 
provide for the payment of interest, not to the supplier, but in fact to the purchaser on 
instalments made, where the supplier is unable to effect delivery. This, it is submitted, 
is a different situation altogether.
9Reference is further made in Interpretation Note No. 48 to the special VAT 
rules regarding “instalment credit agreements” – for example, the time of supply 
is the earlier of delivery, or receipt of payment of any consideration. This, however, 
ignores the special time of supply rules for lay-by agreements as already indicated. 
To support the submission that these transactions cannot be grouped together, the 
trading stock provisions of section 22 will effectively give rise to double taxation, 
notwithstanding limited relief via a debtor’s allowance (section 24(2)) or allowance 
for future expenditure (section 24C) should lay-by agreements be taxed in accordance 
with section 24. This is because such lay-by items remain in the hands of the supplier, 
who retains ownership therein (there is no delivery to the purchaser) for the duration 
of the agreement and which will, apart from the deemed accrual under section 24, 
require an add-back to income by way of a section 22 inclusion in closing inventory 
for the supplier. An amendment to Interpretation Note No. 48 clearly seems necessary 
in order to draw a proper distinction between “credit agreements” and “instalment 
credit agreements” and bring the tax treatment of lay-by agreements into line with 
reality and, of course, the law relating to lay-by agreements.
10Where a consumer is required to make an advance payment in respect of services 
that will only be rendered more than 25 business days later, section 64(1) of the 
Consumer Protection Act specifies that such advance payments will remain the 
property of the consumer. The supplier is merely allowed to make a charge against 
it (once a month in advance) for a pro rata portion of the ensuing month’s services 
(section 64(2)).
11In ITC 707,54 as already discussed, the undertaker was taxed in full on receipt of 
payments for services only to be performed later. In this case, the terms and conditions 
agreed upon between the parties provided that, in the event of failure to pay the 
monthly contribution within 90 days, all previous payments would be forfeited. 
Amounts thus effectively became beneficial receipts, once received, and did not enjoy 
the protection that is now offered by the Consumer Protection Act. Currently, such 
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advance amounts will remain the property of the consumer and, it is submitted that 
in the light of the Consumer Protection Act, there can no longer be a beneficial 
receipt before the month in which such services are rendered. If this is the true legal 
position, then it is submitted that ITC 70755 would now be decided differently.
12The treatment of deposits in respect of containers, pallets or similar objects is 
covered separately in section 66 of the Consumer Protection Act. Unlike lay-by 
agreements and advance payments for services to be rendered, there is no stipulation 
that such deposit must be treated as the consumer’s property. By implication it 
must therefore become the property of the supplier. This treatment in terms of the 
Consumer Protection Act, once more, seems to support the income tax and VAT 
treatment of deposits on containers.
13Although it is considered to be beyond the scope of this article to discuss in detail 
section 11(a) of the Income Tax Act with regard to the deductibility of the contingent 
liability for a refund arising on the receipt of a deposit on a returnable container, 
it is nevertheless considered necessary to briefly discuss the requirement “actually 
incurred” in order to obtain a holistic picture of the tax treatment of deposits received 
in respect of containers. The next paragraph will thus explore this area before 
proceeding to analyse the possible allowance that may be claimed in terms of section 
24C, a provision subsequently introduced into the Income Tax Act to alleviate the 
“unfairness” of taxing certain deposits, prepayments and advances received, without 
allowing a corresponding deduction for future liabilities to incur expenditure arising 
in terms of the agreement.
Meaning of “actually incurred” for the purposes of section 11(a)
1In the Caltex Oil56 case it was held that expenditure “actually incurred” means all 
expenditure for which a liability has been incurred during the year of assessment, 
whether or not the liability has been discharged during that year. If there is no definite 
and absolute liability during the year of assessment to pay an amount, expenditure 
has not actually been incurred (Nasionale Pers57 case). If a conditional obligation 
is stipulated in an agreement and the condition is fulfilled only in the following 
year of assessment, the resultant expenditure is deductible only in the latter year 
because there is no unconditional legal obligation in existence for the first year 
55 Supra.
56 Caltex Oil (SA) Ltd v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1975 (2) All SA 222 (A), 37 SATC 1.
57 Nasionale Pers Bpk v Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste 1986 (3) SA 549 (A), 48 SATC 55.
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(Edgars Stores58case). Contingent liabilities, such as the obligation to repay deposits 
on returnable containers, therefore do not immediately give rise to expenditure as 
being “actually incurred”. Only on the return of the container will a definite legal 
liability come into existence (see the Pyott case).
Section 24C of the Income Tax Act
1The inclusion of deposits, prepayments and advances beneficially received in 
gross income, whilst disallowing potential expenditure obligations to be incurred 
under the relevant contract at a later stage, leads to a “timing mismatch” between 
the recognition of income and the claiming of expenditure incurred in earning it. 
Section 24C (introduced in 1980) effectively permits an exception to the “actually 
incurred” requirement of section 11(a), as well as section 23(e), which prohibits 
the deduction of provisions, by providing for an allowance to be claimed in respect 
of future expenditure to be incurred. This allowance is added back to income in 
the following year of assessment, when a new allowance is calculated in respect 
of deposits, advances or prepayments received, if there is still expenditure to be 
incurred in the future.
2Before granting the section 24C allowance, the Commissioner must be satisfied 
that amounts received as a deposit, prepayment or advance will be used in whole or 
in part to finance such future expenditure in the performance of obligations under 
the relevant contract. If not so satisfied, this allowance will not be granted. There 
must therefore be a clear measure of certainty that such expenditure will, in terms of 
the contractual obligations, be incurred in a future year. According to SARS’ Second 
Draft Interpretation Note59 in this regard, only expenditure that has a high degree 
of probability and inevitability, will be taken into account. “Future expenditure”, 
in terms of the definition, includes expenditure that will in future be allowed as a 
deduction or give rise to the claiming of an allowance.
3A provision for future warranty claims expected to be instituted against the taxpayer 
was disallowed in ITC 160160 as the court was not convinced that there was a clear 
measure of certainty that such expenditure was quantified or even quantifiable. This 
contingent liability was further, at least partly, recoverable from its suppliers and the 
deduction was thus prohibited by section 23(c) of the Income Tax Act. In addition, 
the taxpayer, despite several requests, failed to provide the additional information 
58 Edgars Stores Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1988 (3) SA 876 (A), 50 SATC 81.
59 Second Draft Interpretation Note on Section 24C.
60 ITC 1601 1995, 58 SATC 131.
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requested by the Commissioner. Accordingly, it was held that the taxpayer had failed 
to discharge the onus of proof in showing that the Commissioner did not exercise a 
proper discretion in reaching his decision.
4ITC 169761 involved a share block company that operated a timeshare scheme. Its 
levy income was fully tax free and at least a portion of the investment income could 
also qualify for exemption, provided and to the extent that the company’s deductions 
relating to the earning of levy income exceeded such levy income. In calculating 
the extent to which its allowable deductions exceeded its levy income, the company 
claimed a section 24C allowance which the Commissioner disallowed. The court 
found the Use Agreement between the taxpayer and its members to be an ongoing 
contract, which obliged members to pay levies, while the company had to fulfil its 
obligation to administer the scheme and maintain its fixed and movable property. 
Accordingly, the court held that the company’s liability for future expenditure was 
unconditional and the Commissioner was found not to have properly applied his 
mind to the matter.
5Based on the above, it is submitted that obligations, such as those which arose 
in the Pyott62 case, if decided today, may possibly qualify for relief under section 
24C. Where, based upon past experience, the taxpayer can show a definite trend, 
which is bound to continue in the future, there should be a clear enough measure of 
certainty about the incurral of such expenditure to meet the requirements of section 
24C of the Income Tax Act. In support of this contention, it was noted by the judge 
in the Pyott case that 90 percent of its customers returned the biscuit containers for 
a refund, after the deposit charge had increased by 200 percent. Proper records and 
information will help to convince the Commissioner about the merits of the case and 
discharge the onus of proof that the future refunds have a “high degree of probability 
and inevitability” (as required in terms of this Second Draft Interpretation Note63) 
and that the deposit refund qualifies for the section 24C allowance.
Conclusion
1The objective of this tax story was twofold:
• to make a contribution to the teaching and learning of tax principles by telling the 
story of the Pyott case and placing the case in its historical context, thus enabling 
a more accessible and interesting journey of discovery for the tax scholar; and
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• to revisit the tax principles as enunciated in the Pyott case in relation to the 
taxability of deposits on returnable containers – both from the point of view of 
“gross income” and the deductibility of the contingent liability to repay the deposit 
on the happening of an event – and establish whether the principles so laid down 
can be extended to deposits, prepayments and advances where no returnable 
container is involved.
1In order to achieve this latter objective and thereby make a contribution to the body 
of knowledge in the field of tax law, the research entailed an analysis and discussion 
of the decision in the Pyott case and subsequent related case law, the treatment of 
deposits for the purposes of other taxes and commercial legislation introduced to 
protect the consumer.
2For a deposit to be included in “gross income”, it must be received by the taxpayer 
“on his own behalf and for his own benefit” (see Geldenhuys64) rather than a mere 
physical receipt. Any receipt on behalf of or for the benefit of another person (for 
example, where it is held in trust) means that there is no beneficial receipt or “gross 
income” arising. Whether a taxpayer has a beneficial interest in a receipt will 
ultimately depend upon the intention of the respective parties to a transaction (such 
as the terms and conditions applying and capacity in which an amount is received), 
the circumstances of the case and the impact of commercial legislation.
3Once a revenue amount is beneficially received by or accrued to or in favour of 
a taxpayer, such as a deposit charged on a returnable container, it must be included 
in “gross income”, irrespective of its subsequent payment to some other person or 
the possibility that it may in certain contingent circumstances, such as the return of 
a container, ultimately become refundable. The principle of beneficial receipt can 
be extended to any “deposit” received in the form of an initial payment for goods 
delivered to the purchaser, which actually forms part of the consideration for a non-
capital transaction. This principle would further apply in the case of such a “deposit” 
being made on an asset which is capital in the hands of the seller in order to establish 
the “proceeds” for capital gains tax purposes.
4Nevertheless, the case of Pyott and subsequent court decisions indicated that a 
deposit should not be judged merely on its “label” or accounting treatment. Thus 
where a deposit, prepayment or advance is received for security purposes with a 
definite liability to refund it, such deposit, prepayment or advance is more akin to 
a loan (C v COT65) and does not constitute “gross income”. Only once and to the 
64 Supra.
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extent such deposit, prepayment or advance is subsequently set off against an amount 
due by the other party, can the amount set off be regarded as beneficially received. 
However, the receipt of a refundable deposit, prepayment or advance, which is 
thereafter illegally treated by the taxpayer as income and as his own (MP Finance66), 
may not always save the recipient from being taxed on such receipt.
5This research also highlighted the fact that certain commercial legislation, such 
as the Rental Housing Act and the Consumer Protection Act, can impact directly on 
whether a deposit has been beneficially received and thus constitutes “gross income”. 
For example, all deposits received by a lessor in respect of rented properties must, 
in terms of the Rental Housing Act, be held in a “trust account” until either is set 
off against amounts owing at the end of the lease period or refunded to the lessee. 
Accordingly, such deposits are not included in “gross income” as there cannot be any 
beneficial receipt before such set-off, if any, has taken place.
6Interpretation Note No. 48 was also analysed and found to be out of line with the 
Consumer Protection Act, specifically in relation to lay-by agreements. Ultimately, 
an amendment to SARS’ Interpretation Note No. 48 appears to be necessary to bring 
the tax treatment of lay-by agreements into line with the Consumer Protection Act 
as well as limit the application of section 24 of the Income Tax Act to only “credit 
agreements” as described in that section.
7Whilst a deposit on a returnable container falls within the ambit of “gross income”, 
the taxpayer cannot claim any deduction in terms of sections 11(a) read together 
with 23(e) of the Income Tax Act in respect of the contingent liability to refund 
the deposit, should the container be returned. No expenditure would be “actually 
incurred” before the return of the container. Nevertheless, relief may now be possible 
under section 24C of the Income Tax Act, provided the taxpayer can show by way of 
a clear enough measure of certainty that future expenditure will have to be incurred 
in terms of the contract to earn such income.
8In conclusion, it can be submitted that the general principles as enunciated in the 
Pyott case with regard to the taxability of deposits and deductibility of refunds for the 
return of containers, are still relevant today. However, where no container is involved, 
beneficial ownership must first be established before such deposit, prepayment or 
advance payment becomes taxable, always taking into account the specific provisions 
of legislation such as the Rental Housing Act and the Consumer Protection Act. 
The research has also shown that there is coherence in the treatment of deposits for 
income tax purposes and value-added tax.
66 Supra.
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